

## Message Text

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 084778 TOSEC 030185

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: US, GW, OVIP (GENSCHER, HANS DIETRICH)

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER  
ON APRIL 4

THE FOLLOWING BRIEFING MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR  
YOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON TUESDAY  
APRIL 4 BEGINNING AT 11 A.M. AND CONTINUING INTO A WORKING  
LUNCH. BEGIN TEXT: PARTICIPANTS: US - THE SECRETARY,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY VEST, WILLIAM M. WOESSNER (NOTETAKER).  
FRG - FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, AMBASSADOR VON STADEN  
(INTERPRETER).

LANGUAGES: GERMAN/ENGLISH

BACKGROUND: FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER IS COMING ON BEHALF  
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OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO DISCUSS THE ERW DECISION AND THE  
MODALITIES AND CONTENT OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE CHANCELLOR  
HAS SPECIFICALLY AND EMPHATICALLY REQUESTED THAT THERE BE  
NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ERW DECISION, NOR ANY FURTHER  
CONSULTATIONS IN THE NAC OR IN CAPITALS, UNTIL AFTER  
GENSCHER'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON. THIS NOW OVERSHADOWS THE  
ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE VISIT, WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER  
INITIATED TWO WEEKS AGO FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEMONSTRATING  
THE STRENGTH OF THE US-FRG RELATIONSHIP, THE CLOSENESS OF

OUR CONSULTATIONS, AND THE IMPORTANT ROLE WHICH GENSCHER

HIMSELF PLAYS. IN LIGHT OF THE ERW DEVELOPMENTS, GENSCHER'S VISIT HAS TAKEN ON A NEW ACCENT, AND DISCUSSION OF THAT TOPIC WILL BE AT THE TOP OF HIS AGENDA. HE WILL ALSO WISH TO REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE HORN AND THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS THE KEY ISSUES DISCUSSED BELOW.

KEY ISSUES:

1. US-FRG RELATIONS - LIKE CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, GENSCHER HAS ALWAYS BEEN A SOLID PROPONENT OF STRONG FRG-US TIES. HE BELIEVES THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S STYLE MAY HAVE UNNECESSARILY EXACERBATED SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES AND GENSCHER HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF PERSONAL INITIATIVES WITH THE PRESS AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO EMPHASIZE THE STRENGTH OF THE RELATIONSHIP. WHILE THESE EFFORTS ARE BASED ON THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SINCERE CONVICTIONS, GENSCHER IS ALSO AWARE AS A POLITICIAN OF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED FOR FURTHER DEVELOPING HIS OWN IMAGE AND THE PROFILE OF HIS SMALL FREE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. IMPORTANT STATE ELECTIONS THIS YEAR WILL PROBABLY NOT HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON THE PRESENT COALITION GOVERNMENT IN  
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BONN, BUT GENSCHER'S PARTY COULD SUFFER SIGNIFICANT REGIONAL LOSSES, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WILL BE SEEKING WAYS TO INCREASE HIS PARTY'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL MANEUVERABILITY.

GENSCHER WAS DELIGHTED WITH YOUR VERY POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF US-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE SPIEGEL INTERVIEW, PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S WAKE FOREST ADDRESS, AND HAS SPOKEN POSITIVELY ABOUT FRB CHAIRMAN MILLER'S AND SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL'S RECENT REMARKS ON ANTI-INFLATION POLICY.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR GENSCHER'S PERSONAL INITIATIVES TO PLACE US-GERMAN RELATIONS IN A BALANCED PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE.

-- STATE THAT WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST TO REINFORCE HIS EFFORTS AND THOSE OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT TO IMPROVE THE TONE OF THE PRESS COMMENTARY, AND ASK GENSCHER FOR FURTHER SUGGESTIONS ON WHAT MIGHT BE DONE.

-- NOTE THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 27 LETTER TO THE CHANCELLOR ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN JULY AND EXPRESS OUR CONFIDENCE THAT COOPERATION IN THE ECONOMIC AREA WILL BRING GOOD RESULTS.

2. SALT

US OBJECTIVES:

-- TO RESPOND TO FRG CONCERNS OVER THE IMPACT OF A SALT TWO AGREEMENT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY INTERESTS.

-- TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS ON THE STATUS OF OUR THINKING ON SALT THREE, IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER  
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TO SEEK LIMITATIONS ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS.

-- TO REITERATE OUR STRATEGY ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION, AND ASSURE GENSCHER THAT IT WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE ALLIANCE.

-- TO COUNTER FRG FEARS THAT THE PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS, ONCE IN FORCE, WILL BE EXTENDED.

-- TO BRING GENSCHER UP TO DATE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE FEBRUARY 24 NAC.

FRG OBJECTIVES:

-- TO VOICE CONCERNS OVER THE U.S. NEGLECT OF ALLIANCE INTERESTS IN SALT TWO, AND TO RESTATE THE FRG POSITION THAT THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR BUILD-UP MUST BE ADDRESSED IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- TO REITERATE FRG RESERVATIONS ABOUT OUR FALLBACK POSITION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION, AND ABOUT THE PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON AND SLCMS.

-- TO GAIN A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ILLUSTRATIVE SALT THREE PRINCIPLE ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS WE PROVIDED THE ALLIES AT THE FEBRUARY 24 NAC, AND SPECIFICALLY, TO LEARN WHETHER WE INTEND TO PREDICATE ANY SALT THREE GLCM/SLCM LIMITATIONS ON LIMITS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS.

-- TO DETERMINE WHEN WE ENVISAGE THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONCLUDED.

BACKGROUND: IN THE WAKE OF THE ER DECISION, AS REFLECTED  
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IN SCHMIDT'S CONVERSATION WITH CHRISTOPHER, THE GERMANS' LONGSTANDING CONCERNS ABOUT OUR SALT POLICY HAVE ASSUMED RENEWED FORCE. THEY ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH OUR DECISION NOT TO SEEK SOME REDUCTION IN SOVIET THEATER CAPABILITIES (EITHER THE SS-20 OR TANKS) IN EXCHANGE FOR ABANDONMENT

OF THE ERW. THEY ARE UNCERTAIN OF OUR COMMITMENT TO ADDRESSING THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR BUILD-UP IN FUTURE

ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. THE GERMANS ARE ALSO WORRIED THAT ONCE THE PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS ON CRUISE MISSILES ARE IN FORCE, IT WILL BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT TO CHANGE THEM OR ALLOW THEM TO EXPIRE -- FURTHER LIMITING NATO OPTIONS FOR MEETING THE SS-20/BACKFIRE THREAT.

IN ADDITION TO EXPRESSING THESE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS, GENSCHER MAY RAISE THE FOLLOWING TOPICS:

NON-CIRCUMVENTION: THE FRG CONTINUES TO EXPRESS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THERE BEING ANY NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, AND PARTICULARLY ONE WITH A REFERENCE TO "OTHER STATES", BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL GROUNDS IT WILL GIVE THE SOVIETS TO CHALLENGE INTRA-ALLIANCE DEFENSE COOPERATION. HOWEVER, AFTER WE GAVE THE GERMANS A NON-PAPER CONTAINING THE SUBSTANCE OF AN EVENTUAL US INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT, THEY INFORMED US THEY WOULD NO LONGER OPPOSE OUR PROCEEDING WITH THE FALLBACK LANGUAGE.

WE HAVE TOLD THE FRG THAT WE PLAN TO INFORM THE NAC ON APRIL 5 OF OUR INTENTION TO TABLE THE FALLBACK WHEN WE JUDGE IT WILL RESOLVE THE ISSUE, AND OF THE GENERAL TENOR OF THE INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT. THE FRG HAS TOLD US THEY WILL RESTATE THEIR RESERVATIONS AT THE NAC REGARDING THE PRINCIPLE OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION, BUT WITHOUT DIRECTLY OBJECTING TO OUR USE OF THE FALLBACK.

SALT THREE PRINCIPLE ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS: AT THE FEBRUARY 24 NAC, WE PROVIDED THE ALLIES WITH THE FOLLOWING  
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ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION WHICH WOULD BE PART OF OUR UNILATERAL LIST OF FURTHER OBJECTIVES FOR SALT THREE, TO BE ISSUED OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF THE SALT TWO AGREEMENT: "ANY FUTURE LIMITATIONS ON US SYSTEMS PRINCIPALLY DESIGNED FOR THEATER MISSIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS." AT THE NAC, MOST OF THE ALLIES -- INCLUDING THE FRG -- CAUTIOUSLY ENDORSED THE CONCEPT BEHIND OUR APPROACH: A GENERAL FORMULATION WHICH IDENTIFIES SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS AS LEGITIMATE OBJECTS FOR LIMITATION, BUT WHICH KEEPS OPEN THE OPTION TO SEEK SUCH LIMITATIONS OR NOT, DEPENDING ON LATER DELIBERATIONS IN THE ALLIANCE.

AT THE PRESENT WE HAVE NO DEFINITE PLANS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES ON THIS ISSUE. THE FRG, AT THE NAC AND SUBSEQUENTLY, HAS ASKED US A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TERMS USED IN OUR ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION; GENSCHER MAY ASK WHETHER WE MEAN THAT ANY FUTURE GLCM/SLCM LIMITS MUST BE LINKED TO LIMITS ON SOVIET THEATER SYSTEMS (OUR

FORMULATION IMPLIES THIS, BUT WE WOULD PREFER TO KEEP THE ANSWER AMBIGUOUS). WE ARE CONSIDERING CIRCULATING A NON-PAPER FIRST TO THE FRG, UK, AND FRANCE, AND THEN TO THE WHOLE NAC, EXPLAINING THE MEANING OF OUR ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION, AND HOW ITS BUILT-IN AMBIGUITIES SERVE TO KEEP ALL OPTIONS OPEN WITH RESPECT TO FORUM, PARTICIPANTS, NEGOTIATING LINKAGES, AND THE SYSTEMS TO BE INVOLVED IN ANY GRAY AREA NEGOTIATION.

TALKING POINTS:

-- WE FULLY RECOGNIZE FRG CONCERNS OVER THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POWER IN EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THE SALT AGREEMENT THAT IS TAKING SHAPE  
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WILL SERVE OUR MUTUAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS, TOGETHER WITH THE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS WE ARE UNDERTAKING, IN BALANCING AND CONSTRAINING THE SOVIETS.

-- OUR CONSULTATIONS ON SALT II AND THE SHAPE OF SALT III ARE AN EFFORT TO DEVISE A COMMON APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER; AS LONG AS WE STAY CLOSE TOGETHER ON THESE QUESTIONS, THE SOVIETS CANNOT DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN US.

-- WE HAVE COMPLETED MOST OF THE MAJOR SALT ISSUES, AND IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO WRAP UP THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. I WILL BE GOING TO EUROPE LATER THIS MONTH TO MEET WITH GROMYKO TO DETERMINE IF THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO REACH AGREEMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- I KNOW YOU ARE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL RISKS OF A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE BE TOGETHER ON THIS SO THE SOVIETS CANNOT HOPE TO INTERFERE IN OUR RELATIONS. THE US APPROACH ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION AVOIDS ANY NON-TRANSFER PROVISION AND WILL FULLY PROTECT ALLIED INTERESTS.

-- WE HAVE SHOWN YOU THE TEXT OF AN INTERPRETIVE STATEMENT WE WOULD PLAN TO MAKE TO THE NAC AND TO CONGRESS AFTER SIGNATURE OF A SALT AGREEMENT. THIS WILL PUT OUR POSITION FIRMLY ON THE PUBLIC RECORD.

-- ON THE QUESTION OF CRUISE MISSILES, THE SHORT-TERM LIMITS WE HAVE AGREED TO WILL NOT IMPACT ON ANY OF OUR PROGRAMS. THE PROTOCOL IS, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY IN THE ALLIANCE TO EXAMINE THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE WEAPONS.

-- WE HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED WITH YOU OUR ILLUSTRATIVE

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FORMULATION ON GRAY AREA SYSTEMS WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN A STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES OUTSIDE THE SALT II

TEXT. WE WANT TO DISCUSS THIS FORMULATION WITH YOU AND WITH THE OTHER ALLIES, AS WE BEGIN TO SHAPE OUR APPROACH TO SALT III.

### 3. THE NATO SUMMIT

US OBJECTIVES: TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON HOW TO MAKE THE NATO SUMMIT A SUCCESS.

FRG OBJECTIVES: TO HEAR US VIEWS

ESSENTIAL FACTORS: THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF THE MAY30-31 NATO SUMMIT IS A STRONG ALLIED ENDORSEMENT OF THE WORK ON THE LONDON SUMMIT INITIATIVES. AS IT STANDS NOW, ALLIED DECISIONS ON THE LTDP COULD DOMINATE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT, GIVING IT AN OVERLY MILITARY CAST THAT WOULD FUEL CRITICISM AT THE CONCURRENT MEETING OF THE SSOD AT THE UN. WE BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD GIVE INCREASED ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING THE SUMMIT'S COMPLEMENTARY POLITICAL DIMENSION AND NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE IN FURTHERING WORLD STABILITY, PEACE, DETENTE, DISARMAMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

POINTS TO BE MADE

-- WE WANT THE SUMMIT TO PRODUCE CONCRETE ALLIED DECISIONS TO STRENGTHEN ALLIED DEFENSES, AND WILL NEED STRONG FRG SUPPORT FOR THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

-- WE ALSO WANT TO BALANCE THE PUBLIC ATTENTION ON DEFENSE  
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ISSUES BY EMPHASIZING NATO'S POLITICAL ROLE AND ITS TWIN GOALS OF DETENTE AND DETERRENCE.

### 4. MBFR

AFTER OBTAINING DOD CLEARANCE ON MARCH 30, WE INSTRUCTED USNATO CONSULT FIRST WITH THE FRG AND UK PERMREPS AND--IF THEY AGREE--TO STATE IN THE SPC THAT WE PREFER TO TABLE THE WESTERN INITIATIVE DURING THIS ROUND. OUR STATEMENT COULD BE ISSUED AS EARLY AS MONDAY AFTERNOON. SINCE THE FRG POSITION WILL BE CRUCIAL TO FORMING AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS, WE SHOULD DEFER TO THE GERMANS IF THEY WISH TO HOLD THE INITIATIVE UNTIL THE NEXT ROUND (WHICH BEGINS ON MAY 25).

TALKING POINTS:

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE ALLIES WERE ABLE TO BRING THE EAST TO ACCEPT AN ADDITIONAL EXCHANGE OF DATA. THE DATA TABLED BY THE EAST AT LEAST GIVES US A BASIS FOR PRESSING THEM TO EXPLAIN THE LARGE DISCREPANCY IN OUR RESPECTIVE FIGURES ON EASTERN FORCE LEVELS.

-- NOW THAT THE PATH HAS BEEN CLEARED FOR TABLING THE WESTERN INITIATIVE, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OUR NATO MISSION TO CONSULT WITH AMBASSADOR PAULS AND THE UK PERMREP AND-- IF THEY AGREE--TO STATE IN THE SPC OUR VIEW THAT TABLING THE INITIATIVE AT LEAST A FEW DAYS BEFORE THE END OF THIS ROUND COULD HAVE SEVERAL CLEAR ADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST:

-- IT WOULD GIVE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS TIME TO ASK QUESTIONS, THEN TO SUBMIT THE INITIATIVE AND OUR RESPONSES TO THEIR PRINCIPALS DURING THE BREAK.

-- IT COULD SPUR THE EAST TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE IN THE DATA DISCUSSION AND TO MAKE A GREATER SECRET

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EFFORT TO MOVE MBFR FORWARD.

-- IT WOULD ENABLE THE ALLIANCE TO ENTER BOTH THE SSOD AND THE NATO SUMMIT IN AN IMPROVED POSITION, WHILE AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE THAT THE TIMING WAS CONTRIVED FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES.

-- AND, IT WOULD PREVENT THE EAST FROM UPSTAGING US BY MOVING FIRST TO TABLE AN INITIATIVE OF ITS OWN.

CONTINGENCIES:

-- IF GENSCHER AGREES TO EARLY TABLING: WHEN THE INITIATIVE IS TABLED, WE SHOULD EACH LOOK FOR WAYS TO GIVE POLITICAL REINFORCEMENT. FOR INSTANCE, I PLAN TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS TO MBFR IN A SPEECH ON ARMS CONTROL WHICH I WILL DELIVER ON APRIL 10.

-- IF ASKED OUR VIEW OF THE RELATION OF GRAY AREA SYSTEMS TO MBFR: THE ILLUSTRATIVE FORMULATION WHICH WE PRESENTED TO THE NAC ON FEBRUARY 24 LEFT THE QUESTION OF FORUM OPEN TO DISCUSSION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

5. AWACS

US OBJECTIVES: TO ENCOURAGE EARLY FRG FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE AWACS SYSTEM.

FRG OBJECTIVES: TO SUPPORT AWACS IN PRINCIPLE BUT TO SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF POSTPONING FRG FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE SYSTEM FOR UP TO TWO YEARS.

BACKGROUND: GIVEN ITS VERY HIGH COST, THERE IS  
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CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO AWACS IN THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT AND A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE SYSTEM AMONG THE UNIFORMED SERVICES, BUT A FIRM, CONCERTED EFFORT BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER AND DEFENSE MINISTER APEL COULD PROBABLY OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS. WHILE FRG OFFICIALS THEMSELVES SUGGESTED A NEGATIVE COUPLING OF THE TANK GUN DECISION AND AWACS, THEY NEVER SUGGESTED A POSITIVE COUPLING, AND WE DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD BE IMPRESSED BY ARGUMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY NOW "OWE" US APPROVAL OF AWACS. THEY ARE MOST LIKELY TO BE SWAYED BY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTATION ON THE NEED FOR THE SYSTEM.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- AWACS WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE IN THE 1980'S AND ALSO HAS CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE.

-- THE USG PLACES GREAT IMPORTANCE ON EARLY FRG PARTICIPATION IN AWACS.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE FRG WILL GIVE THIS SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS AND WILL BE ABLE TO PUSH HARD FOR AWACS AT THE MAY DPC MEETING AND THE NATO SUMMIT.

-- A NUMBER OF OTHER NATO COUNTRIES HAVE NOW MADE COMMITMENTS. HOWEVER, THE WHOLE AWACS PACKAGE PROGRAM PROPOSAL COULD COME APART IF KEY LEADERS HESITATE IN THE FINAL STATES OF SEEKING AGREEMENT.

## 6. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

US OBJECTIVES: TO REVIEW US POLICY IN THIS AREA.

FRG OBJECTIVES: TO LEARN THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSIONS IN BRAZIL AND HOW THESE, PLUS POSSIBLY THE  
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NEW NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION LEGISLATION, MAY AFFECT THE FRG-BRAZIL NUCLEAR ARRANGEMENT, INCLUDING FUTURE FRG SUPPLY OF FUEL.



(BACKGROUND AND POINTS TO BE MADE WILL BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE MEMORANDUM.)

## 7. US-GDR RELATIONS

US OBJECTIVE: TO ASSURE THE FRG THAT US RELATIONS WITH THE GDR WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AT A MEASURED PACE CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES IN

BERLIN AND GERMANY AS A WHOLE.

FRG OBJECTIVE: TO DETERMINE THE STATE OF US-GDR RELATIONS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE STATUS OF THE US-GDR CONSULAR CONVENTION NEGOTIATIONS.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS: US-GDR RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED AT A MEASURED PACE SINCE DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION IN 1974. THE GDR WOULD LIKE TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS BOTH TO BOLSTER ITS INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE AND TO GAIN GREATER ACCESS TO US TECHNOLOGY AND THE AMERICAN MARKET. THE US HAS INSISTED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO PROCEED FASTER UNTIL THE GDR HONORS AN AGREEMENT TO CONCLUDE A US-GDR CONSULAR CONVENTION PROTECTING US CITIZEN RIGHTS IN EAST GERMANY.

CONCLUSION OF THE CONSULAR CONVENTION HAS BEEN HELD UP BECAUSE OF THE EAST GERMAN WISH TO EXERT A LEGAL DEFINITION OF GDR NATIONALITY INTO THE AGREEMENT. THIS CREATES PROBLEMS FOR US BOTH BECAUSE OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION'S RELEVANCE TO OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BERLIN AND GERMANY  
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AS A WHOLE AND BECAUSE THE CONCEPT OF GERMAN NATIONALITY IS OF PREEMINENT IMPORTANCE TO THE FRG WHICH DOES NOT WISH TO IMPLY THAT THE GDR COULD SEAL THE DIVISION OF GERMANY VIA PARTIAL AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS THIS ONE. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE FRG, UK, AND FRANCE WE PROPOSED TO THE GDR A SEPARATE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS SETTING FORTH EACH SIDE'S POSITION ON THE QUESTION. THIS MATTER IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

-- US RELATIONS WITH THE GDR ARE DEVELOPING AT A MEASURED PACE, MUCH MORE SLOWLY THAN THE GDR WOULD WISH. I DO NOT FORESEE A MAJOR CHANGE IN THIS;

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE PROPOSED A SEPARATE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH THE GDR WHICH WOULD PERMIT EACH SIDE TO STATE ITS POSITION ON NATIONALITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE US-GDR CONSULAR CONVENTION. THE GDR STILL HAS OUR PROPOSAL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

-- GDR FOREIGN MINISTER FISCHER HAS ASKED TO SEE ME WHILE HE IS HERE FOR THE SSOD; I MAY SEE HIM DURING THE WEEK OF JUNE 5.

#### 8. SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS

THE PAST YEAR IN SOVIET-GERMAN RELATIONS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY IMMOBILITY IN VARIOUS RESPECTS. FIRST, BREZHNEV'S PLANNED VISIT TO BONN HAS BEEN POSTPONED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. SECONDLY, GERMAN HOPES OF MAKING AN FRG INITIATIVE IN MBFR BECAME STALLED, ALTHOUGH THIS MAY OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE. FINALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SOVIET PROTESTS REGARDING FRG ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN, THE SOVIET ACCUSATION THAT THE FRG IS  
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OPERATING A MISSILE TESTING STATION IN ZAIRE (OTRAG), THE ERW ISSUE, AND GROWING GERMAN INFLUENCE IN NATO.

NEVERTHELESS, THE EVIDENCE THAT THESE PROBLEMS, WHILE SERIOUS, ARE NOT CRITICAL IS BEST REFLECTED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING THE SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT DIRECTLY. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER HAS ALSO BEEN SPARED FROM SERIOUS CRITICISM IN THE SOVIET PRESS. THIS REFLECTS A SOVIET REALIZATION THAT THE ALTERNATIVES TO A SCHMIDT GOVERNMENT ARE NOT THAT FAVORABLE FROM THEIR VIEWPOINT, AS WELL AS A PROBABLE SOVIET ASSESSMENT THAT THE PROBLEMS AND IRRITANTS IN FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS BEAR WATCHING BUT ARE NOT LIKELY TO GET OUT OF HAND.

#### 9. RFE/RL REQUEST FOR NEW TRANSMITTERS AT HOLZKIRCHEN (TO RAISE IF TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT)

US OBJECTIVE: TO RECEIVE A POSITIVE FRG DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FRG OBJECTIVE: TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE FRG IS GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR REQUEST.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS: IN MARCH 1977, THE USG ASKED THE FRG TO CONCUR IN THE REPLACEMENT OF FOUR 10 KW TRANSMITTERS WITH FOUR 250 KW TRANSMITTERS. OUR REQUEST IS STILL PENDING IN THE OFFICE OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, WHO IS VERY SENSITIVE TO THE POSSIBLE ADVERSE IMPACT OF RFE/RL BROADCASTS ON FRG RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE.

POINTS TO BE MADE:

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-- NOTE THAT THE USG REQUEST HAS BEEN PENDING FOR ONE YEAR.

-- EXPLAIN THAT WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE FRG'S POLITICAL CONCERNS, BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT, DR. BRZEZINSKI AND

AMBASSADOR STOESSEL HAVE DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT IN DETAIL WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT.

-- EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PROMPT FRG APPROVAL, SO THAT CONSTRUCTION OF THE TRANSMITTERS CAN BEGIN IN APRIL.

DRAFTED:EUR/CE:SMKLINGAMAN, APPROVED: EUR:JAMES E. GOODBY,  
CONCURRENCES: EUR/CE:WMWOESSNER/RCBARKLEY, EUR/RPM:  
BCLARK/LBRECKON/SJLEDOGAR/WSHINN, PM:JKAHAN, PM/DCA:  
SSTEINER/RMPALMER, EUR/SOV:GMATTHEWS, ACADA:LFISCHER.

CHRISTOPHER  
SUBJECT TELEGRAM REISSUED AS NODIS PER  
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## Message Attributes

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**Subject:** YOUR MEETING WITH FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ON APRIL 4  
**TAGS:** OVIP, PEPR, PARM, US, GE, (GENSCHER, HANS DIETRICH)  
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